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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to unpack how the price of industrial electricity is determined within the 
liberalized power market in Great Britain in the context of the ongoing reform of the 
Chinese power sector, initiated by the March 2015 No.9 document. 
 
It is organized around a discussion of the various components of the final industrial price of 
electricity (namely the wholesale price, the retail margin, network charges, the costs of 
system operation and government taxes and levies). In the case of each component, we 
consider what drives its total cost and its pricing structure. 
 
The paper has arisen from an ongoing research project involving the authors and multiple 
stakeholders across China. The associated dialogue has resulted in two papers looking at the 
general international lessons from power sector reform for China (Pollitt et al., 2017) and 
the specific lessons arising from the pilot power market in Guangdong province (Pollitt et 
al., 2018). Those earlier papers set the scene for this one, in that they contain lots of detail 
on the state of the reform, its underlying objectives and the general applicability of 
international reform experience to the unique context of China. 
 
By way of background, we briefly summarise these two earlier papers.  
 
The first paper examined how the then high price of industrial electricity in China (in 2014) 
could be reduced by the apparent unexplained gap between the China and the United 
States in industrial electricity prices. This gap required a 12% price fall in the Chinese price 
to be eliminated.  We suggested four lessons from international experience2 which could 
deliver this: reform of power plant dispatch (which would allow industrial prices to fall by 1-
2%); increasing the efficiency of the grid companies (which might reduce industrial prices by 
2-3%); rebalancing charges away from industrial to residential customers to better reflect 
underlying system costs (which might reduce industrial prices by up to 5%); and reducing 
the high rate of investment in generation/networks (could reduce prices for industrial 
customers by of the order of 3%). 
 
The second paper examined the development of the electricity market pilot in Guangdong 
province. Guangdong is a leading reform province, but it has very high industrial electricity 
prices (150% higher than a reasonably comparable industrial US state such as Texas). 
Following the March 2015 reform document we can observe impressive entry of new 
retailers into the power market and reforms appear to have reduced power market prices 
by around 10%. However, we observed a number areas for improvement in the operation of 
the wholesale power market and the regulation of network charges. On the power market 
itself these included: a lack of price transparency to the players; that market prices were not 
integrated into dispatch decisions; the need for more comprehensive markets covering 
more volume and more electricity products; current excess supply, that may encourage 
over-competitive bidding; and problems with market clearing rules. More generally we 
                                                     
2 Our international lessons drew on Joskow (2008) and Pollitt and Anaya (2016). 
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noted the need for: an independent regulator and clear responsibility for enforcement of 
the Anti-monopoly Act; possible asset reallocation given largest firm has 30% of generation; 
the importance of transmission and distribution charge reform, in overall price reduction; 
and clarity on the future of the reforms, which currently lack legislative backing. 
 
In this paper, we begin by discussing the components of the price of industrial electricity in 
Great Britain, as an example of a fully reformed electricity market, where the market is 
roughly comparable in size to a reasonably large Chinese province. We proceed to discuss 
the key actors in the liberalized electricity system in Great Britain, before unpacking each of 
the components of the price. We discuss the market determined elements first, then go on 
to introduce and discuss the regulated elements of the price before finishing with the 
central government determined price components. Our discussion covers the determination 
of the wholesale price, the retail margin, transmission charges, system balancing charges, 
distribution charges and environmental levies and taxes. In each of these cases we discuss 
the process by which they are determined (led by the market, the regulator, the central 
government or more than one) and the specific lessons for China. We conclude by 
emphasizing some of the high-level lessons on electricity price determination for China. 
 
2. How is the industrial electricity price set in Great Britain3 
 
The final retail price of industrial electricity is made up of six elements in Great Britain. 
These are a combination of unregulated market determined elements (the wholesale price 
and the retail margin); regulated charges (transmission and distribution charges); central 
government determined levies and taxes; and mixed elements (system balancing charges) 
that are made up of both regulated and market determined costs. The final price (charged 
by retailers) is not regulated for typical industrial customers. Regulated charges are 
determined by an independent regulatory agency. Central government levies and taxes are 
the responsibility of the Finance Ministry (HM Treasury in the UK). In the UK we distinguish 
between industrial, commercial and residential users, so the category of industrial users is 
narrower than in China, where ‘industrial’ covers both industrial and commercial customers.  
 
The breakdown of the final price of industrial electricity in the UK in 2016 is shown in Table 
1, for industry consuming more than 2000 MWh per year. This shows that roughly 40% of 
the cost is market determined, 20% is determined by the regulator and 40% is determined 
by the central government. We will discuss each of the sub-elements in the paper. Note the 
price of industrial electricity in the UK in 2016 is roughly equal to the price of industrial 
electricity in Guangdong in 2015 (see Pollitt et al., 2018). 
 
  
                                                     
3 For electrical purposes, the United Kingdom is divided up into two administrative areas: 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Electricity in Great Britain is regulated by Ofgem. Some 
of the statistics we refer to below include Northern Ireland in the UK, but Great Britain is 
responsible for around 98% of electricity consumption in the UK. 
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Table 1 
Breakdown of industrial price in UK 
 
Source: Derived from Grubb and Drummond (2018). Before discounts. 
Band 1D to 1F customers, 2000MWh+ annual demand. £1=1.16 Euros 
 
 
At the outset, it is important to clarify the role of government in the UK electricity sector: 
the government does not determine the final price4; the regulator does determine the 
maximum revenue for regulated elements; the regulator does approve the tariff 
methodology for regulated charges; the regulator does determine security of supply 
requirements and penalties; the government does monitor competition in power markets. 
While electricity market reform may have the aim of delivering low prices, lower prices are 
not always the right answer. When fossil fuels are becoming more expensive or generating 
capacity is getting scarce, higher prices may be the right answer. 
 
3. The key actors in the electricity system in Great Britain 
 
The UK electricity sector in 2017 can be characterized as follows.5 It had final consumption 
of 301 TWh, this has been falling since its peak in 2005 (it was 14% lower in 2017 than the 
2005 peak). This reflects changing industrial structure and a large rise in energy efficiency 
(household energy demand is 16% below its peak, in spite of a rise in the number of 
households). Energy supply in 2017 was 353 TWh, of which 4.2% was imports. Of domestic 
generation of 336 TWh, 40.4% was from natural gas, 29.3% was renewables and 20.6% was 
                                                     
4 In the residential sector, there is retail price cap (known as ‘safeguard tariff’). However, 
this is a maximum tariff. Actual tariffs can be lower than this. 
5 See Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics 2018, (BEIS, 2018). 
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from nuclear, with only 6.7% from coal. The speed and extent of the transition away from 
coal and towards renewables in the UK electricity system has been remarkable and 
demonstrates – in line with more general evidence6 - that electricity reform is not 
incompatible with ambitious environmental targets. In 2010 renewables made up 6.9% of 
electricity generation, while coal was 28%7, 7 years later this has been more than 
completely reversed. In 1990, at the time of the introduction of the electricity market, the 
UK was generating 72% of its electricity from coal.8 
 
The reform of the electricity sector in the UK from 1990, significantly changed the 
institutions involved in the electricity sector.9 In England and Wales the monopoly pubic 
generation and transmission company (the CEGB) was broken up and 12 regional electricity 
distribution and retail companies were able to enter generation and compete with one 
another for retail customers (via legally separate retail businesses). In Scotland and 
Northern Ireland incumbent integrated generation, network and retail companies were also 
subject to breakup and competition. 
 
In mid-2018 there were 170 licensed generators and 64 licensed non-domestic electricity 
retailers in Great Britain.10 Figure 1 shows the current structure of the industry. In Great 
Britain generation and retail is dominated by ‘big’ six generator-retailers, which have arisen 
from incumbent companies. Transmission in England and Wales is owned by National Grid 
and distribution is owned by 6 companies (including UKPN and WPD). National Grid is the 
system operator for the whole of Great Britain. While some companies continue to have 
interests in generation, distribution and retail, this is now much less common and there is 
strict legal unbundling of distribution network businesses from the competitive parts of the 
electricity sector. Independent power projects and new retailers have taken significant 
market shares from the ‘big’ six companies, and the generator and retailer market shares 
are not matched within the ‘big’ six. 
 
  
                                                     
6 See for example, Vona and Nicolli (2014). 
7 See DECC (2011). 
8 See DECC (2009). 
9 See Henney (1994) for the definitive discussion of what happened (and why) at the time of 
privatisation to the structure of the electricity industry. For an excellent summary of the GB 
experience following privatisation see Newbery (2000) and (2005). For a discussion of the 
electricity privatisation in the context of the general privatisation programme in the UK, see 
Pollitt (1999), and for a discussion of electricity liberalisation in the global context of energy 
market liberalisation, see Pollitt (2012a). 
10 Source: Ofgem (2018a), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2018/10/state_of_the_energy_market_repor
t_2018_1.pdf 
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Figure 1: The Structure of the Electricity Industry in the UK 
 
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the market shares in both the wholesale electricity market and 
business retail market in 2017. The HHI index for the wholesale electricity market is around 
1034, indicating that market concentration is relatively low, equivalent to 10 equally sized 
firms competing with each other. For the retail market the HHI is even lower, at around 
1000. 
Figure 2: Wholesale Market Shares 2017 
 
Source: Ofgem (2018), State of the Energy Market Report 2018, p.50. 
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Figure 3: Business retail market shares 2017 
 
 
Source: Large-scale electricity profile class 5 to 8 +HH: 
Ofgem (2018), State of the Energy Market Report 2018, p.38. 
 
There are 7 electricity distribution network companies in the UK (UKPN, WPD, Northern 
Powergrid, Electricity Northwest, SP Energy Networks, Scottish and Southern Energy (SSE) 
Power Distribution and Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE), covering 15 monopoly distribution 
areas. Of these groups only two are now part of companies with either generation or retail 
interests in the UK (SP Energy Networks and SSE Power Distribution). There are four 
onshore transmission companies in the UK (National Grid, SP Energy Networks, SSE Power 
Distribution and NIE).  
 
The ownership structure of the electricity industry in Great Britain in very diverse. Two of 
the ‘big’ six generator retailers – SSE and Centrica – are listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, together with the generator Drax and the transmission company National Grid. 
The other four major generator retailers are subsidiaries of large pan-European energy 
companies - EdF, RWE, E.ON, Iberdrola. Of the distribution companies UKPN is owned by 
Hong Kong investors, while WPD is owned by PPL, a listed energy company in the US, 
Northern Powergrid is owned by Berkshire Hathaway and Electricity Northwest is privately 
held. The ownership of the UK electricity industry reflects significant foreign ownership. The 
attraction of holding UK electricity assets reflects diversification by shareholders in other 
countries. This makes UK domestic regulation easier (because it weakens the lobbying 
power of producer interests and enables the regulator to focus on UK consumers). It also 
facilitates reciprocal UK investment abroad (not just in the electricity sector). 
 
Other key actors in the electricity sector in Great Britain are worth mentioning. 
 
Elexon administers the balancing and settlement system for reconciling payments between 
generators and retailers within the electricity industry. This is an extremely important part 
of any restructured industry. Elexon describes itself in the following way: ‘In March 2001, 
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the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC), was launched as part of NETA (New Electricity 
Trading arrangements). ELEXON administers the Code on behalf of the UK electricity 
industry. We provide and procure the services needed to implement the code and compare 
how much electricity generators and suppliers say they will produce or consume with actual 
volumes. We work out a price for the difference and then transfer funds.’11 Elexon was 
established by an obligation in National Grid’s transmission licence and, technically, is 
wholly owned by National Grid but operates at arms length to it with a completely separate 
governance structure. 
 
The power market is also characterised by a number of other players. These include 
aggregators (who aggregate up both generation and demand on behalf of smaller 
generators and smaller non-domestic customers). There are around 19 of these.12 Traders 
who trade electricity financially on the available power exchanges. Power can be traded 
across multiple platforms a day ahead (or under longer term contracts). These trading 
platforms include APX Power UK and N2EX. There are around 75 traders on APX.13 
Interconnectors are also significant in the Great Britain market. These offer the ability to 
both supply power into and out of GB (acting as generators and loads). Currently these 
interconnectors are: 2GW to France (IFA); 1GW to the Netherlands (BritNed); 500MW to 
Northern Ireland (Moyle) and 500MW to the Republic of Ireland (East West). There is 
another 3.4 GW under construction (as of October 2018). 
 
Finally, it is important to note the role of the regulators and the government within the 
electricity system. While there is no state ownership of operational electricity assets14 in the 
UK, the government does influence the industry via the regulatory regime and central 
government ministries. The GB industry is directly overseen by two independent regulators: 
Ofgem (the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) and the CMA (Competition and Markets 
Authority) which is the general competition authority. The primary duty of these two 
regulators is to oversee the competitiveness of the electricity sector in both the wholesale 
and retail markets and to approve and monitor monopoly network charges. These two 
agencies operate at arms-length from government. However, the central government, led 
by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) sets regulatory 
framework, can issue guidance to the regulator, sets subsidy and tax regime and can refer 
the whole industry for investigation to the CMA15.  Members of the regulatory boards are 
appointed by Government for a fixed term. 
                                                     
11 https://www.elexon.co.uk/about/ 
12 See PA Consulting Group (2016), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2016/07/aggregators_barriers_and_external
_impacts_a_report_by_pa_consulting_0.pdf 
13 See http://www.epexspot.com/en/membership/list_of_members 
14 The government does own decommissioning nuclear power plants, and some test 
reactors. Municipalities have limited interests in local electricity companies, e.g. Bristol 
Energy. 
15 See CMA (2017), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/624706/cma3-markets-supplemental-guidance-updated-june-2017.pdf 
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4. Wholesale prices 
 
We now turn to the elements of the final price of industrial electricity and how these are 
determined. An obvious place to start in thinking about the wholesale electricity price 
element of the final price is the spot market price for electricity. So, what do we mean by a 
spot market in a liberalized power market? 
 
We normally mean the main near real time market (see Stoft, 2002) in which the wholesale 
prices determined every hour, half-hour, 15 minutes or 5 minutes from supply offers and 
demand bids from individual generators and retailers wishing to sell and buy power. 
Underlying bids and offers guide dispatch of individual power plants. In many power 
markets generators can declare prices (e.g. in PJM market in the USA) at which they are 
willing to be dispatched or quantities (e.g. in the market in GB) which they want to be 
dispatched to system operator. ‘Spot’ prices/quantities should reflect the underlying value 
of generation and loads. The system operator uses such spot prices/quantities to dispatch 
the system paying attention to the need for instantaneous correction to match supply and 
demand in real time, on the basis of constraints and balancing markets/contracts. There is 
always an issue of how to link spot market prices (which are often day-ahead) and physical 
dispatch. Instantaneous bidding is neither possible nor desirable because instantaneous 
prices cannot change behavior in real time and might lack transparency (as in practice they 
have to be calculated ex ante).  
 
Within a power market actual real time grid stability is physically maintained in much the 
same way as in traditional vertically integrated power systems, following ‘gate closure’ (the 
last chance for generators and loads to change their market position). However spot 
markets do create opportunities for withholding by generators as in the California electricity 
crisis of 2000-0116, whereby generators manipulated market prices by withdrawing some 
capacity deliberately to drive up prices on their remaining generation. This sort of behavior 
must be monitored, detected and penalised. 
 
A crucial part of the wholesale market is the presence of retailers who buy power on behalf 
of their customers. In Great Britain retailers need to buy wholesale power to cover 100% of 
their power sales. Retailers are often integrated with generators. Retailers can use spot and 
forward markets and bilateral contracts. Derivative energy products are available17. A lot of 
power is bought and sold on bilateral contracts for 12-18 months, often linked to spot 
prices. Retailers often hedge using rolling contracts (e.g. by rolling over 18 month contracts 
every month, thus taking 18 months for any sustained adjustment in the underlying prices 
to be fully reflected in their wholesale generation contracts). Smaller retailers tend to use 
shorter term contracts. This is because there is more relative uncertainty for them on their 
future demand and they compete on basis of short term price competitiveness rather than 
reputation. Some jurisdictions (e.g. in South America) specify the nature of contracts that 
should be entered into for regulated retail customers. This can be done indirectly by 
                                                     
16 See Sweeney (2002). 
17 See London Energy Brokers Association: www.leba.org.uk 
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specifying the benchmark wholesale contract price that will be used in the calculation of the 
maximum regulated retail price. 
 
In GB the bilateral contract markets and the power exchange (PX) are not run by the system 
operator (SO). Instead the SO operates the half hourly balancing market and other ancillary 
services markets (e.g. for frequency response). 97% of all wholesale energy is self-
dispatched in GB. This is different from a compulsory pool/mandatory day ahead (DA) 
market such as used in the US (e.g. by PJM) where the system operator uses the day ahead 
market to guide pricing and dispatch in real time.18 
 
How self-dispatch works is as follows. Generators can give their Final Physical Notification 
(FPN) to the system operator of which plants they want to run happens up to 1 hour ahead 
of real time, i.e. generators can adjust their stated position up to that time. After that, the 
system operator takes control of the plants with object of minimizing the costs of any 
balancing actions (i.e. the system operator is the sole counterparty to balancing market 
transactions). Production (generator) and consumption (retailer) accounts transactions 
(Energy Contract Volume Notifications, ECVN) must also be declared with consumption 
accounts noting position in all 14 distribution areas (as separate BMUs). Generators and 
retailers have a strong incentive to self-balance their individual positions either physically or 
via their participation in the balancing mechanism. Failure to self-balance implies exposure 
to balancing charges arising from the system operator’s need to buy or sell power to exactly 
balance the system. Balancing charges are thus calculated to incentivize balance and 
encourage accurate supply and demand matching. There is an incentive to bid accurately as 
under competition law there is an up to 10% of turnover fine possible for market power 
abuse.  
 
Such self-dispatch is different from PJM or China, but with sophisticated players this allows 
generators to reflect all of their internal costs in their notifications to the system operator. 
Self-dispatch offers the potential for improved market position/performance with plant risk 
issues in ways not facilitated by central dispatch algorithms, which although they can take 
formal account of many plant characteristics (such as ramping costs) cannot take into 
account all of the costs faced by an individual unit in being dispatched. It is important to 
note that the efficiency of self- vs central dispatch is usually measured with respect to a 
central dispatch calculation, thus is biased towards finding central dispatch more efficient 
and not modelling hidden constraints in system19. 
 
Power plants in Great Britain are dispatched in real time by National Grid, there are no 
other dispatch layers. The regional distribution companies do not dispatch generation or 
loads, though they may occasionally exercise constraint management contracts within the 
distribution system. Larger generators (on the distribution system) must be visible to the 
transmission system operator above 50 MW (as a balancing mechanism unit – BMU) and 
                                                     
18 See for example: 
http://www.gridscientific.com/images/electricity_trading_arrangements_beginners_guide.
pdf And https://www.elexon.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/BSCP01_v17.0.pdf 
and Onaiwu (2009). 
19 See for example Sioshansi et al. (2008). 
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can register below this size threshold.20 Interconnectors to France, Ireland and Netherlands 
act like generators and loads. However, there is some inter-TSO collaboration through 
CORESO. It looks at how physical transmission can be configured to help maximise reliability 
and minimise congestion. It gives advice to the coordinating TSOs on how controllable 
devices like phase-shifting transformers, unconstrained DC links and discretionary switching 
can be used to help neighbours and hence overall network performance. CORESO is one of a 
number of Regional Security Coordinators (RSCs) of the EU single electricity market. It brings 
together 7 national system operators in western Europe which does coordinate ‘from a few 
days ahead until Intraday (few hours before real time)’.21 
 
The wholesale power market is closely linked to fossil fuel markets and carbon markets, via 
the fact that fossil fuel prices and carbon prices are an important cost component for any 
oil, gas or coal fired generation unit. Carbon pricing (both emissions permits and taxes) 
appears in wholesale generator costs as an extra fuel cost as fossil fuel generators have to 
‘burn’ carbon permits and pay carbon taxes when they generate and produce carbon 
dioxide. The figures for wholesale costs in Table 1 net off the impact of carbon pricing, but 
reported wholesale prices include these costs. We discuss their determination in a separate 
section below. In Great Britain, most subsidised low carbon generation participates in the 
energy market like any other generator in real-time and receives top up revenue from 
contract for difference (CFD) and renewable obligation certificate (ROC) payments. Small FIT 
generators (mostly households) receive payment from retailer that they are contracted to 
sell to (the so called ‘FIT Licensee’).22 
 
While wholesale power markets are not very concentrated in the UK now, that has not 
always been the case and there have been many examples of market power problems in 
electricity wholesale markets23. Indeed, tacit collusion is a very real problem in electricity 
markets at the wholesale and retail market levels due to repeated interaction of companies 
making bids and offers many times a day within transparent power markets. The regulator, 
Ofgem, has done a lot on transparency of profitability.24 The GB market falls under REMIT 
legislation on energy market integrity and transparency.25 Ofgem has referred the whole 
                                                     
20 See National Grid (2011), 
https://www.nationalgrid.com/sites/default/files/documents/Managing%20Intermittent%2
0and%20Inflexible%20Generation%20in%20the%20Balancing%20Mechanism%20Consultati
on.pdf 
21 See https://www.coreso.eu/ 
22 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/fit/about-fit-scheme 
23 See the discussion in Newbery (2005) and Jamasb and Pollitt (2005). 
24 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/gas/retail-market/retail-market-
monitoring/understanding-profits-large-energy-suppliers. Ofgem requires the production of 
consolidated segmental accounts which show the profits of the large integrated firms in 
each segment of the GB market. 
25 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/gas/wholesale-market/european-market/remit 
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market to the CMA recently who examined competition thoroughly over the period 2014-
16.26  
 
Alex Henney (2011) documents the 8-year process that followed the introduction of the 
competitive wholesale power market in Great Britain, that eventually led to the much more 
competitive market that see today. This consisted of a series of investigations and reports 
with recommendations. These included the Pool Price Enquiry December 1991 (by Offer – 
the then electricity only regulator which predated Ofgem) which found gaming by the two 
incumbent fossil-fuel generating companies declaring plant unavailable day ahead to drive 
up capacity price on the day and the Report on Constrained-On Plant Oct 1992 (by Offer) 
which found gaming by behind constraint plants. Subsequent investigations led to 
significant structural changes: the Pool price statement July 1993 (Offer) allowed the largest 
customers to bid in the Pool (to reduce generator market power) and then following the 
threat to refer the two largest generators to the competition authority in Feb 1994 (Offer), 
the largest generators agreed to sell power plants. However, the two major generators 
gamed this agreement by putting anti-competitive earn-out clauses into their power plant 
sales terms (raising the marginal costs faced by the new owners and forcing them to bid 
higher). Merger investigations (MMC 1996 a,b) in 1996 by the competition authority of the 
largest generators’ proposals to buy retailers resulted in the mergers being blocked: this led 
to further generation divestitures before the mergers allowed. These asset sell–offs 
eventually led to wholesale power prices collapsing in early 200127. Meanwhile the 1997-
1999 investigation of pool arrangements28, led to the New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
(NETA) from 2001, which replaced the Pool with self-dispatch and a balancing market. 
 
The GB experience illustrates the importance of creating sufficient competition prior to the 
opening of the market. The creation of five equally sized fossil fuel generators (rather than 
two) in Great Britain in 1990 with a range of different power plants would have saved years 
of regulatory intervention to establish a competitive wholesale market. China has ample 
opportunity to learn from the UK and reorganize the ownership of its largely state owned 
electricity generation sector prior to full market opening. This would significantly improve 
its subsequent prospects for competition. 
 
As in all markets for heavily standardized products, there is a need to monitor withholding 
and signaling of prices. The promotion of competition via new entry and interconnection is 
important, as monitoring and price regulation is less satisfactory than actual competition. 
Regulation of some bidding behind local constraints is likely to be necessary (in the UK 
withholding of generation capacity in Scotland has been an issue, behind a significant 
transmission constraint between Scotland and England). Rapid enforcement action against 
anti-competitive behaviour is helpful, in order to limit the damage done by it and to 
increase the deterrent effect of enforcement. The stimulation of competition may mean 
                                                     
26 See 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/576bca94ed915d622c000077/appendix-4-1-
market-power-in-generation-fr.pdf 
27 See Evans and Green (2003) for analysis of what caused the fall in wholesale prices 
around this time. 
28 See for example, Offer (1998). 
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that divestiture of generation plant by price-setting incumbents may be necessary. The 
independence of the SO from generation and retail is necessary in order to prevent (or 
highlight) anti-competitive actions by the SO aimed at promoting its own generation. 
 
The reform of the electricity generation sector in Great Britain did raise the sort of ‘social 
stability’ issues that are important in China. Collusion to raise the price of generation from 
existing generators and divestitures by the incumbent generators probably accelerated the 
run-down of coal fired generation in favour of gas (see Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, and 
Newbery 2005). The government attempted to slow the reduction in the use of high priced 
domestic coal by privatized generators by signing preferential contracts for domestic coal 
for the first few years after the creation of the market. Subsequently, it announced a ‘gas 
moratorium’ in 1997 – which made it more difficult to get planning permission for new gas 
fired power plants - in an attempt to slow build of gas fired generation, to promote coal use 
in electricity generation.29 Renewables support (especially for onshore wind in Scotland and 
offshore has been promoted partly as a way of supporting Scottish development and 
northern ports (e.g. Hull). The withdrawal of financial support for onshore wind in England 
(from 2017) was also about local residents’ opposition to the siting of wind parks. Carbon 
pricing was initially kept low in 2013-1430 so as not to accelerate run down of coal, but has 
since then has strongly favoured gas fired generation (as we discuss below).  
 
Following the reforms in 1990, nuclear generation was unable to cover its long run costs in 
the new electricity market (though its participation in the wholesale market strongly 
incentivized it to lower its operating costs and increase its output, which it did very 
effectively), but the whole retail base was subject to a levy which built up a fund to finance 
long term nuclear liabilities. Falls in the electricity price in 2001-02 caused the financial 
collapse of the nuclear generator British Energy, which was successfully rescued by the 
government and returned to the private sector (at a profit to the government).31 
 
Several additional aspects of the GB wholesale power market are important for China as it 
proceeds with wholesale power markets. All generation is in the market (including all 
renewables and nuclear), not some of the generation as with many of the current round of 
pilot markets32. Demand participates directly in the market and bidding is two sided in the 
sense that generators and loads participate in wholesale markets. There are a range of 
contracts between retail and generation, not just one type of financial product (e.g. monthly 
contracts as in Guangdong at the moment, or day-ahead contracts in California pre-crisis). 
There are strong incentives on generators to make least cost plant available. Plants are 
dispatched by the system operator on basis of declared availability and least cost 
adjustments. There is complete transparency on government attempts to influence dispatch 
and investment (e.g. via coal contracts or bans on certain types of generation). In wholesale 
                                                     
29 The moratorium was short-lived and not particularly effective. It was abandoned in mid-
1999 and was never a complete ban. 
30 See Hirst (2018) for a discussion of the history of carbon price floor in the UK. 
31 See Taylor (2007) and (2016). 
32 See for example discussion of this in the context of the Guangdong market pilot in Pollitt 
et al. (2018). 
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power markets active competition and regulatory policy has been very important in 
promoting competition. 
 
While spot markets are relatively easy to set up, futures markets for electricity take time 
and have been considered problematic.33 This is because liquidity is an issue in a market 
with important underlying physics which limits the ease of modelling future prices. Physical 
delivery has to occur in real time and stocks do not exist in electricity markets. This means 
that electricity markets are difficult to model years ahead and incumbent generators and 
retailers are strongly favoured as participants in electricity futures markets. Financial 
electricity futures markets do not necessarily bring major benefits to electricity consumers 
as they primarily exist to serve the needs of financial investors. Financial instruments should 
of themselves be of limited interest to electricity regulators and should primarily be the 
concern of financial regulators. 
 
The GB market is equivalent to provincial market in China. It is important to say that GB sits 
within an increasingly integrated single electricity market across Europe. Spot markets 
across Europe are subject to market coupling (via the EUPHEMIA algorithm)34, whereby 
prices are the same in different spot markets in the absence of transmission constraints. 
This is a point of coordination where power exchanges need to use information on available 
transmission capacity (or available transfer capabilities – ATCs) from TSOs to resolve prices 
within zones. Extending markets over wider areas has benefits in terms of increased market 
efficiency35 and where there is political support for price convergence (particularly in the 
low price areas where price convergence might raise wholesale prices). GB is a high price 
area within Europe and has hence been keen to integrate its electricity market with that in 
northern Europe. However, this work of integrating national markets in Europe has been a 
slow process, particularly, in the area of ancillary services where it remains a work in 
progress. 
 
5. Retail margins 
 
The other main component of the industrial price that is competitively determined is the 
retail margin. This is the mark-up on top of all of the other cost elements – wholesale prices, 
network charges and taxes and levies - that retailers add to cover their own costs. 
 
So, what do retailers (suppliers) do in GB? They contract for wholesale power in spot and 
forward markets, hedge their physical contract position with financial contracts, meter the 
consumption of their customers, advertise and switch customers, provide customer services 
such as electrical equipment testing and monitoring and decide on and offer retail tariffs. It 
is important to understand that in fully liberalized power markets retailers bill for the full 
price of power, pay regulated transmission and distribution charges to network companies, 
accept and manage the non-payment risk of final customers, fulfil any social obligations 
                                                     
33 See Ofgem (2016) as an example of regulatory concerns about market liquidity. 
34 See Pollitt (2018a) for a discussion of the development of the single electricity market in 
Europe. 
35 See Mansur and White (2012) on the benefits of extending the PJM market. 
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imposed on tariffs (e.g. low use tariffs) and promote energy efficiency (e.g. via schemes like 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and Energy Company Obligation (ECO) in GB)36. 
 
The GB retail electricity market was opened in stages via the removal of retail ‘supply’ price 
controls37: from 1990, 1 MW+ customers could choose supplier; from 1994, all 100kW+ 
customers could choose supplier (i.e. all half hourly metered customers); and from 1998-99, 
all customers (i.e. non-half hourly metered) could choose supplier. As market opening 
progressed significant horizontal and vertical (with generation) reintegration occurred 
involving retail companies, as noted above. A very significant driver of competition was the 
entry of the former gas monopoly, British Gas, into the electricity market. By 2002 it was the 
largest supplier of electricity. 
 
There has been significant market innovation since 1990: many final customers (~ 40% 
(i.e.~10 million consumers)) have dual fuel – electricity and gas - direct debit tariffs; and 
there are a wide range of fixed, capped, green, social tariffs available in the market. 
However, the regulator has been concerned about state of supply competition (see Haney 
and Pollitt, 2014). Ofgem launched a Competition Probe in 2008 following large price 
increases – which were primarily due to commodity price rises - finding no evidence of 
cartels but introducing new protections for vulnerable customers. These concerns resulted 
in the Retail Market Review in 2011, and this eventually led to the energy markets 
(electricity and gas) being referred to CMA – the general competition authority - in June 
2014. 
 
There have been important developments with retail competition in electricity. In Europe 
EU directives on unbundling have been very significant in promoting retail competition and 
competition from gas incumbents has been important for stimulating retail competition 
generally in electricity markets. Small and medium sized companies (SMEs) have been 
inactive in the retail market (as they often consume less electricity than a typical household) 
and this market segment has been subject to some limited re-regulation of retail tariff, 
following CMA 2014-16 inquiry. There has been an ongoing concern in some countries 
about degree of separation between retail and distribution businesses. New Zealand (in 
1999) and The Netherlands (in 2006)38 have ownership unbundled networks from retail. 
Texas and the UK have widespread voluntary ownership unbundling of networks and retail. 
The evidence from New Zealand seems to suggest that residential competition is 
significantly promoted by smart meters, which have brought down the time taken to switch 
(and the accuracy of switching) between retailers significantly39. 
 
                                                     
36 See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/eco/overview-previous-
schemes (Accessed 27 November 2018) for more information. 
37 See Henney (2011). 
38 See Nillesen and Pollitt (2011) for a detailed analysis of the impact of ownership 
separation of the electricity distribution business from retail electricity in New Zealand. 
39 Monthly switching has more than doubled in New Zealand since the roll-out of smart 
meters began. See the statistics at: 
https://emi.ea.govt.nz/Retail/Reports/Tagged/consumer-switching?_si=v|2 
Accessed 27 November 2018. 
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Some overall lessons from the retail competition experience in GB (and generally) can be 
identified. There has been an active market for larger non-domestic customers with smaller 
commercial customers regulated initially. There are concerns about small non-domestic (as 
well as domestic) customer inertia due to a lack of materiality or split incentives (between 
the bill payer and user) in buildings. There are worries about distorted incentives towards 
smaller retailers who have been exempted from certain social / energy efficiency 
obligations, and are hence able to undercut larger retailers unfairly by setting prices which 
are below the ‘competitive’ price. Retailing is increasingly about collecting revenue to pay 
government imposed charges, which increases relative risks for larger more responsible 
retailers, who correctly allow for non-payment risk. New retailers can target larger more 
credit worthy customers, but this leaves incumbent retailers with customers who are less 
attractive to new suppliers or who are less able to pay off their existing bills to facilitate a 
switch between retailers, putting incumbents at a further disadvantage. 
 
There are a number of lessons for China from GB’s experience with a competitive retail 
electricity market. Stand-alone retailers have struggled with the risks of buying short in spot 
and monthly markets and selling long – most customers sign up for one year fixed price  
contracts and  some retailers have exited. This is not necessarily a problem (some such 
retailers have done well and there may be real advantages to vertical integration) but it is a 
challenge for such retailers. China’s new retailers (e.g. in the Guangdong market pilot) are 
not doing retail as in GB because they do not bill the customer for the full cost of their 
electricity. They are more like energy service companies advising customers on purchasing 
cheaper wholesale power (most payment risk remains with the local grid company that 
continues to bill the final customer). Ideally, existing incumbents should be able to compete 
in a genuine retail market. One way of doing this might be to create retail businesses at the 
provincial, or sub-provincial level within SGCC and CSG and allow these retailers to compete 
within and across their current geographical limits. 
 
Retail competition limits do not have to (and should not) limit the size of the wholesale 
market. Although the retail market in Great Britain opened up to full competition gradually, 
retailers purchasing electricity on behalf of their regulated customers still participate fully in 
the wholesale market. Thus, China needs to find a way of getting regulated customers into 
the wholesale market (e.g. via procurement auctions for default contract retail customers). 
Future smart energy retailing business models that combine retail contracts, energy 
equipment sales and maintenance and energy data analytics will require sophisticated 
retailers (as can be observed in Great Britain) able to offer integrated solutions including 
metering and use of meter data. 
 
Genuine retail competition helps with the discovery of the diversity of customer 
preferences. Thus customers can reveal preferences for their payment method (e.g. 
monthly, annually), the kind of tariff they want (e.g. green or brown) and their willingness to 
accept different tariff structures (e.g. flat tariffs, peak pricing, time of use, or real time 
prices). Over time, retail competition reveals what sorts of advertising methods are 
acceptable (e.g. door to door selling of residential tariffs was restricted in the UK) and social 
concerns about tariff fairness. 
 
6. Regulated network charges determination 
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Before discussing each of the regulator determined elements of the industrial price we need 
to discuss the general background to how are network charges – for both transmission and 
distribution -  determined in GB. 
 
The total level of revenue allowed to be recovered is set by the regulator for both 
transmission, direct system operation costs and distribution related charges. Approved tariff 
methodologies then apportion this total among different customer groups to set individual 
prices for these services that form the charges that retailers pay on behalf of their 
customers. The basics of the process by which total revenue for transmission and 
distribution are derived are similar, we consider this first. The UK uses ex ante regulation 
and sets a base revenue formula and associated quality of service incentives for a fixed 
period in advance. This gives rise to strong incentives to perform against the formula.  
 
Ofgem, the independent energy regulator, is responsible for network charges and these are 
determined without direct reference to the central government. Ofgem is an Independent 
Regulatory Agency (IRA) with list of statutory duties. Independence involves the fixed term 
appointment of its CEO, chair and board consisting of executives and independents. Its 
primary functions, laid out its governing legislation, are: the promotion of competition and 
non-discriminatory access (as agent of competition authority) to the grid; the regulation of 
the level and structure of network charges (Ofgem oversees periodic price control review 
process); and independence to ensure investor interests are protected and arbitrary 
government interference is made more costly. 
 
It is important to emphasise that Ofgem is a creature of legislation (Electricity Act, Gas Act, 
Competition Act) and it is, largely, independent of government. Although its board members 
are appointed by Secretary of State for Energy, the regulator answers to Parliament. It is 
intended to be an independent voice for economic analysis of the interests of electricity 
consumers. This is a key safeguard for company shareholders. For instance, if a future 
government wanted to renationalise some of the companies and/or sequestrate private 
investment, it will be the independent regulator – assuming it initially remains in place - that 
will likely identify the detriment to consumers of any reneging on commercial agreements. 
Its decisions are subject to appeal. Companies and affected 3rd parties can appeal decisions 
to the Competition & Markets Authority (also largely independent of government) or seek 
judicial review of process (from the independent judiciary). It is duty bound to consider the 
need for licensees – generators, network companies and suppliers -  to fund the obligations 
upon them. This is not a guarantee that any company costs will be covered but a general 
assurance that efficient costs will be covered. For monopolies in the sector (such as the 
network companies, Ofgem attempts to simulate competition (with the use of rewards as 
well as penalties). 
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Ofgem has a significant budget and resources: £90m in 2017-1840. It has a benefit cost ratio 
of 87 to 1 (by its own calculation!41). It has 816 staff, of which 401 are in regulation, 273 in 
E-Serve, 142 in corporate functions. E-serve, administers various government programmes 
towards energy including energy efficiency, renewables support and social programmes 
(including ROCs, FITs, ECO and WHD). Ofgem raises money from licensed electricity 
companies and administration fees and is self-funding. It is subject to a 15% real terms 
reduction in its own funding by 2019-20 (set in 2015). It is staffed by well-paid civil servants. 
The importance of appropriately resourced regulators in successful electricity market 
reforms is emphasized in Pollitt and Stern (2011). 
 
Ofgem and its predecessor regulator Offer have accumulated significant experience with the 
regulation of network companies, where network charges have been determined in 
successive price control reviews since privatisation in 1990. Distribution price control 
reviews have (or will) reset prices from: 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2023.  
Transmission price control reviews have (or will) reset prices in: 1993, 1997, 2001, 2007, 
2013 and 2021. 
 
Until 2010, price-cap (RPI-X) regulation in GB was explicitly designed to avoid the asset gold-
plating that was observed under rate of return regulation, as used in US. It was designed by 
Stephen Littlechild (the first independent electricity regulator in GB from 1989) for BT (the 
former monopoly fixed line telephone network operator) to facilitate a transition to a 
competitive unregulated market and to mimic the effect of competition. Under RPI-X the 
regulator collects data from the regulated utility on forecast efficient operating costs Ot ; 
regulatory asset values, including investment plans Bt ; depreciation Dt ; and demand 
forecasts. It then determines the revenue required: Rt = Ot + rBt + Dt , where  r  is average 
cost of capital. Looking at the difference between the efficient level of revenue required and 
the actual revenue of the firm allows an X factor to be identified which is the scope for 
annual reductions in revenue. RPI-X refers to the fact that revenue is uprated by a measure 
of inflation (RPI in the UK) and reduced by an annual ‘productivity’ factor, X42.  
 
The basic characteristics of OFGEM RPI-X approach in GB involved fixing the revenue 
required in a 5-year control period for each electricity distribution company and each 
electricity transmission company. An initial consultation document was normally issued 18 
months before end of current price control period. Several subsequent documents refined 
the calculation of the required revenue with responses invited each time. Responses were 
placed in public domain unless marked confidential. A final document was issued by the 
                                                     
40 See Ofgem (2018b), https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/ofgem-annual-
report-and-accounts-2017-18 
41 See Ofgem (2018c), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2018/07/consumer_impact_report_-
_published0307.pdf 
 
 
42 This factor was intended to include all relevant factors which might drive the level of 
efficient revenue (including the costs of quality, or the relative movement in labour/capital 
costs vis-à-vis general inflation). 
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regulator within 6 months of end of current control period. Regulated companies then have 
one month to appeal to competition authority (originally the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission – MMC - and then the Competition Commission - CC) if unhappy with proposals 
at this stage. 
 
There a number of key factors in the price control process. These include the regulatory 
asset base (RAB), on which the company is allowed to earn a return. Establishing an initial 
value for this is difficult, but subsequent updating is relatively straightforward on the basis 
of agreed additions to the capital base and allowed depreciation. The allowed rate of return 
or weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is calculated depending on the appropriate risk 
factor and gearing ratio. The efficient level of operating expenditure (OPEX), which may be 
subject to capital expenditure (CAPEX) trade-off. And CAPEX itself which requires careful 
auditing as to whether the proposed investments are both necessary and being efficiently 
done. Figure 4 shows a regulated firm with starting revenue in 2010 against its efficient level 
of revenue and different scenarios for X factors to reduce its revenue to the efficient level 
by 2015. 
 
Figure 4: The impact of X factors on the revenue of a regulated firm 
 
 
A central part of the regulation of the required expenditure of the regulated company has 
been the benchmarking of the actual performance. This requires a set of comparable 
companies, and enough data to identify important cost drivers. It is also important to 
predict the movement in the frontier level of performance over the upcoming price control 
period. The regulator in setting prices therefore needs to: identify a comparator group of 
firms; identify a range of efficiency measurements; identify the inputs, outputs and 
environmental variables to be taken into account of in the analysis; collect data on 
consistent basis; conduct the analysis; generate efficiency differences; generate efficient 
cost predictions for each firm; and set X on the basis of the difference between actual and 
efficient costs. 
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A difficult part of setting network charges is getting the right incentives for investment. 
Benchmarking has been used extensively for opex, but it is hard for capex. This is because 
capex is lumpy and the exact timing of when it should be done can be difficult to predict in 
advance. Ofgem have scrutinized investment plans of the companies and approved a 
baseline level of capex with incentives to economise on actual capital expenditure using a 
form of menu regulation and cost sharing.43 This involves companies that accept a lower 
baseline revenue getting stronger incentives to cut their costs, whereby they keep a larger 
share of any savings relative to the baseline44. 
 
It is important to reiterate that Ofgem has employed ex-ante (incentive) regulation, where 
revenue formula are set in advance and companies have an incentive to deliver services 
efficiently (at low cost) and at high quality (because various quality measures -such as 
customer minutes lost - are also subject to baseline quality targets which if exceeded allow 
the company to increase its revenue)45. This is the best simulation of competition. There are 
strong incentives to outperform ex ante revenue allowances. Companies can improve 
returns to shareholders within each regulatory period. This also reveals information for 
regulators to better set allowances and pass efficiencies to consumers in the next regulatory 
period. This system removes regulatory uncertainties and overheads inherent in ex-post 
regulation (and the risks of regulatory micromanagement). It gives scope for innovation in 
opex, capex and financing costs together with internalised outputs. However the revenue 
formulae are tricky to set and there remain future uncertainties (especially with respect to 
climate change and climate policy) and a large information asymmetry between the private 
knowledge of the regulated companies and the regulator. 
 
As we will document later the RPI-X regulation of transmission and distribution charges was 
very successful in GB. However the system was changed in 2010. The background to this 
change was changing circumstances (Pollitt, 2008), including: rising investment needs in 
electricity distribution (+48%, 2005-10 vs 2000-05) and in electricity transmission (+79%, 00-
05 vs 07-12); network tariff charges being increasingly driven by capex not opex;   
and network capex being increased by rising amounts of subsidised renewables connected 
to the system. A review was announced by Ofgem in 2008 – the RPI-X@20 review (see 
Ofgem, 2009c) - focussing on customer engagement, sustainability and the scale and scope 
of innovation. The result of this review was a new system of regulation called RIIO: Revenue 
= Incentives + Innovation + Outputs. Under RIIO there was more emphasis on incentives, 
promoting network innovation and on a wider range of outputs (such as stakeholder 
satisfaction). Notable changes included more money for innovation, a longer price control 
period (8 rather than 5 years) and a greater emphasis on total expenditure (Totex) not just 
capex and opex. However, RIIO is more of an evolution of RPI-X than a revolution in the way 
network charges are determined. 
 
One interesting observation for China is that Great Britain does have some cross-subsidies 
between areas in transmission and distribution charging. These always exist within a single 
                                                     
43 For a description of Ofgem’s regulatory process for electricity distribution firms, see 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2007). 
44 See for an example of the menu regulation scheme, Ofgem (2009a, p.120). 
45 See for a discussion of quality incentives, Ofgem (2009b, p.63). 
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service area (e.g. within UK distribution network operator (DNO) areas and the regions of 
Guangdong). Transmission and distribution charges are not fully cost reflective in this sense. 
However, in the UK they are not aimed at promoting economic development in 
underdeveloped regions as in China. It is a good idea not to distort the market elements of 
the electricity price to deliver a locational cross-subsidy. It is better to use transmission and 
distribution charges to do this. This is easy to administer and pass on to customers, the 
difficulty is that it may distort connection location decisions. Another way to deliver lower 
electricity prices to particular regions is to simply levy a per MWh charge on everyone and 
reduce final price of electricity for customers in the favoured region, however it is more 
difficult to ensure pass through. At the provincial level in China, one or other of the trading 
provinces could tax imports/exports of cheap electricity to finance the cross-subsidies. For 
example, Guangdong could tax hydro imports from Yunnan, or Yunnan could tax exports to 
Guangdong. These taxes would raise revenue without distorting the wholesale price, and 
the revenue could be used to subsidise electricity sales to favoured areas. 
 
7. Transmission charges 
 
RPI-X regulation was very successful in reducing transmission charges. These fell by around 
40% between 1990 and 2005 as a result of gently rising demand, falling operating costs and 
modest capital expenditure. Figure 5 shows the reduction in real operating costs at National 
Grid Electricity Transmission (NGET), the largest transmission company in GB (accounting for 
around 80% of total GB transmission revenue). Figure 6 shows the evolution of real 
investment at NGET over the same period, which has been financed successfully in the 
privatized company. 
 
 
Source: National Grid 
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Source: National Grid. Pre-1991 figures are based on CEGB information sources, and are 
adjusted to reflect one-off investment in the GB-France interconnector. 
 
Meanwhile the transmission system has remained very reliable, with no increase in loss of 
supply incidents (Figure 7) or in energy not supplied (Figure 8). Note that total supply is of 
the order of 300 TWh, so the level of energy not supplied is trivial. 
 
 
Custom connections are for certain industrial customers who accept higher levels of 
interruption in return for lower tariffs. 
Source: National Grid 
 
 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
Overall transmission company revenues are determined by the regulator as discussed in the 
previous section. The charges which customers of the transmission system pay are paid via: 
connection charges, which are charged to generators and loads/distributors; transmission 
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use of system charges (TNUoS), which are charged to generators and loads (generators pay 
per MW and loads pay per MW and per MWh); and international interconnector charges, 
which are largely paid for by users via arbitrage revenue. Transmission losses are recovered 
via a transmission loss multiplier which adjusts metered volumes (allocated 45% to 
generators, 55% to retailers), calculated by Elexon. There are incentive payments for quality 
of service. We discuss these elements in more detail below. 
 
Connection charging is an asset based charge levied on users to recover the costs, with a 
reasonable rate of return, of providing assets for connection to the GB transmission system. 
The charges relate to the cost of assets installed solely for and only capable of use by an 
individual user. They are charged by asset, taking account of asset value, asset age, site-
specific maintenance and the costs of running the transmission system. 
 
Generation TNUoS charges reflect the incremental cost of facilitating generation on the 
transmission network: the higher network requirement the higher the charge, this 
incentivises efficient location. It is charged to all Directly Connected Generation; 
interconnectors do not pay; but the zonal element is also paid by Non-Licence Exemptible 
Embedded Generation. Annual Chargeable Capacity is based on the maximum transmission 
entry capacity (TEC), in zones where the price is negative, the output is taken to be the 
average of three “proving runs”. 
 
Demand TNUoS charges reflect the incremental cost of facilitating offtake from the 
transmission network: the higher the network requirement, the higher the charge. This 
incentivises efficient location of demand and/or offsetting distributed generation. It is 
charged to all offtakes, but international interconnectors do not pay. Annual Chargeable 
Capacity is based on half-hourly metered consumption. This is assessed on the “Triad” which 
equals the average of consumption in the 3 half-hours of largest system demand between 
November and March separated by 10 days. Half-hourly metered consumers can reduce off-
take charges by managing demand in ~20 likely peak demand periods per winter. Non-half-
hourly metered consumption is charged based on energy taken between 16:00 and 19:00 
throughout the year. 
 
The current split between generation and demand charges is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: TNUoS 2018/19 Regulated revenue 
 
Source: National Grid 
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The calculation of the price signal in the zonal charging for transmission capacity is built up 
as follows: take a base network; adjust for the winter peak, contracted generation and 
forecast demand; measure the flow on each line and the total MW (Tm); add a MW on at 
each node and observe the new flow MW (Tmn); calculate nodal cost of accommodating the 
increase, Tm – TMn  = Ti (MWkm); applying an historic cost of providing a MWKm, £/MWkm 
expansion constant (EC); use this to calculate TNUoS and cost per MW, Ti x EC = £ / MW; 
and group into zones for actual charging. The generation TNUoS zones are shown in Figure 
10 and the demand TNUoS zones are shown in Figure 11. The current tariff rates vary 
considerably by zone. In 2018-19, it will cost a generator £20.89 / kW to be connected in the 
north of Scotland, but it would be paid £11.26 / kW if it was connected in Greater London.46 
Similarly, a load connected in Greater London would pay £54.91 / kW, against only £26.30 / 
kW in the north of Scotland.47 
 
  
                                                     
46 See National Grid (2018, p.13). 
47 See National Grid (2018, p.8). 
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Figure 10: Generation Transmission Use of System charging zones in GB 
 
Source: National Grid (2018, p.47). 
 
Figure 11: Demand Transmission Use of System charging zones in GB 
 
Source: National Grid (2018, p.48). 
 
 
The reconciliation between the allowed total revenue (in the previous section) with the 
revenue actually raised is as follows. The annual tariff is determined in January before 
relevant charging year starting April. It seeks recovery of allowed revenues (and best 
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endeavours not to exceed allowed revenues). It is based on a forecast of the charge-base 
(TEC, half-hourly metered triad demands and non-half-hourly metered demand). Users are 
initially charged monthly on the basis of the forecast charge-base. These revenues are 
subject to reconciliation with the actual demands/consumption as the energy market 
settlement is finalised. The tariff values are not adjusted. Total revenue from reconciled 
charges may be larger or smaller than the allowed revenues. The system operator must 
reduce subsequent allowed revenues (2 years after the charge year) with interest on any 
over recovery. Penal interest is payable if actual recovery exceeds 2.75%. The system 
operator may recover under recoveries (by increasing recovery 2 years after charge year). 
Interest costs are not recoverable if revenue recoveries are less than 94.5%. If large under 
or over recoveries occur in successive years, the SO must explain the reasons for this and 
seek the regulator’s permission for corrective actions. 
 
The transmission revenue is subject to a Transmission Network Reliability Incentive. This 
was introduced following high profile interruptions in London & Birmingham in 2003. This is 
an opportunity to earn up to 1% additional revenue (currently, around £11-12m) for annual 
loss of supply below the annual average. It includes the potential to lose up to 1.5% revenue 
(£17-18m) for annual loss of supply above the annual average. The nature of the incentive is 
illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: NGET’s 2008/09 Reliability Incentive Scheme 
 
Effective value of lost load initially ~ £50/kWh 
Source: National Grid 
 
International interconnectors are regulated differently and their regulation has evolved 
somewhat over time. In 2001, the French interconnector (IFA) was separately licensed (from 
the onshore transmission system) requiring: non-discriminatory regulated 3rd party access 
(RTPA) with “Use it or lose it” access rights; and compliance with European Union (EU) “use 
of congestion revenues” requirements which means capacity sales revenues not required 
for “guaranteeing availability” must be returned to national TSO charge-payers. In recent 
years, Ofgem have decided that IFA revenues are exceeding that needed to guarantee 
availability and have imposed a cap and revenues sharing mechanism. In the mid 2000s, 
BritNed (linking England and the Netherlands) was conceived of as a merchant 
interconnector project through a National Grid and TenneT joint venture. This cable is 
therefore owned by the incumbent onshore transmission companies at either end, but 
separate from their regular transmission system operator (TSO) activities. It finances its 
capital and operational costs from implicit and explicit capacity sales. As part of securing an 
exemption from the EU use of congestion revenues requirement, the European Commission 
required a cap on the returns achieved (measured over 25 years of planned operation). 
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National Grid and TenneT agreed to continue the project despite the asymmetric return 
prospects (a cap on the maximum revenue, but no guaranteed minimum revenue). 
 
Other interconnectors have been subject to different arrangements. The Northern Ireland 
to Southwest Scotland (Moyle) transmission link was built and operated by a company 
funded by Northern Ireland transmission charge-payers (capacity sales reduce charge-payer 
costs). The Ireland-England (East-West) interconnector was built by the Irish Electricity 
Supply Board as a TSO regulated asset funded by Irish transmission charge-payers. For new 
links to Belgium and Norway, National Grid and partner TSOs worked with regulators to 
make a hybrid regulated/merchant arrangement such that there is a broadly symmetrical 
cap and floor on sales revenues. Other companies are considering interconnectors (e.g. 
ElecLink plan to use the Channel Tunnel).  They have indicated they will use an asymmetric 
capped merchant model.  
 
We can make some observations on locational pricing & cost-reflectivity of transmission 
charges in GB. GB has not so far adopted locational marginal prices (LMPs) to reflect short 
run transmission network constraints48. In-line with the initial primary role of National Grid 
as a ‘wire provider’ in England & Wales, the initial charging methodology allocated allowed 
revenues to the degree users made transits across key boundaries. A review of transmission 
charging in 1992 identified merits in signalling short-run marginal costs but decided to signal 
long-run (investment cost-based) marginal costs on the basis of consistency with National 
Grid’s role as a ‘wire provider’ and practical issues.  
 
These practical issues included the following. The fact that in 1992 the extraction of short-
run shadow prices from the complex scheduling and dispatch Pool software - in use at the 
time - was non-trivial. Peak network power flow patterns were relatively stable and this 
facilitated long-run use and network need predictions. Market parties wanted a transparent 
and stable tariff for at least the next year. Improving long-run signals were judged adequate 
for informing the location of CCGT new entrants. The incremental benefits of short-run 
signals were initially calculated to be moderate in a centrally dispatched market. 
Distribution charging follows a broadly similar long-run (investment cost-based) approach 
(but considerably different in detail). The introduction of generation and storage self-
dispatch (with NETA), the development of variable wind, higher market driven 
interconnector flows, an active demand side and increasing internal congestion in the 
network – due to increasing renewables - mean the case for short-run signals is increasing 
and a further review is imminent. 
 
Some important lessons for China from the GB experience with transmission charging 
include the following. There is some value in charging some transmission costs to 
generators to focus incentives on generators, rather than indirectly via loads. Locational 
signals can be delivered to incentivise the location of generators and loads via zonal charges 
or via locational marginal prices (LMPs). LMPs are volatile and may not be as good long term 
signals as zonal transmission charges. Though the existence of the ability to trade financial 
transmission rights (FTRs) does mitigate some of the financial risk associated with LMPs. 
History, even in LMP jurisdictions, suggests zonal charges should be implemented first as a 
                                                     
48 For discussions of locational marginal prices see Bohn et al. (1984) and Hogan (1992). 
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stepping stone to LMPs.49 LMPs do not solve the residual transmission pricing problem. 
There is still a need to recover most of the fixed cost of the transmission system via another 
charging mechanism. 
 
8. System balancing charges  
 
Within the overall industrial price of electricity, the charges for system operation in GB 
covers all of the costs incurred by the system operator. These consist of internal (staff and 
IT) costs (very small, c.£100m per annum) and the external (procurement) costs which could 
be as high as £850m. Internal costs are subject to price cap regulation, similar to 
transmission. External costs are subject to market testing and incentives for their overall 
minimisation. In GB, both are recovered by a balancing service use of system charge (BSUoS) 
from generation and demand (50:50) per MWh, less imbalance charges (described below) 
recovered from parties.50 The accepted bids and offers for energy balancing are published.51  
 
The largest component of external system operation costs arises from the balancing 
mechanism. Figure 13 summarises the place of the balancing mechanism (BM) within the 
pricing of energy following the end of the Pool in 2001 and the introduction of the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements, and the subsequent British Electricity Trading 
Arrangements from 2005. 
 
Figure 13: The place of the balancing mechanism relative to real time 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
Imbalance, and hence exposure to the balancing mechanism, has to be measured. Market 
parties register bilateral contract volumes to market & settlement system operator (Elexon) 
at Gate-closure (t-1 hour). Notifications update relevant (market wide) production and 
consumption accounts. Physical meters are registered to particular Balancing Mechanism 
                                                     
49 See Pollitt (2012b) on the history of ISOs in the US. 
50 See https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/charging-and-methodology/balancing-
services-use-system-bsuos-charges 
51 See https://www.bmreports.com/bmrs/?q=balancing/detailprices 
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Units (BMUs) who include large generators (>50MW) and must have individual BMUs linked 
to production accounts. Suppliers have a BMU per distribution network all aggregated to a 
market wide consumption account. Half-hour meters are compulsory for generators and 
large loads (>100kW). Half-hour meters measure the flow from transmission to distribution 
networks. 
 
Initial settlement involves metering aggregators summing half-hourly meter values to 
supplier BMUs and allocating the remaining transmission to distribution system (TxDx) 
flow to supplier BMUs in-line with supplier customer estimates. Under final settlement: 
non-half hourly meter readings are allocated to half-hours using one of a number of 
standard profiles for specific customer classes. Residual error between TxDx flow and 
supplier BMUs (which include distribution system losses) are allocated pro-rata. Initial 
‘cashout’ settlement (on the difference between initial meter volumes & contract volumes) 
is undertaken at t+28 days. Final cashout reconciliation (using final meter allocations) is at 
t+14 months. 
 
The system operator’s role in balancing the system is as follows. Notifications of intended 
physical positions (generation self-dispatch & demand forecasts) to the system operator are 
separate from contract volume notifications. Initial position notifications are submitted at t-
24 hours. These are updated as new information emerges until the t-1hour Final Physical 
Notification (FPN). Notifications are location specific to the Balancing Mechanism Units 
(BMU). The system operator will make national demand forecasts which suppliers may use 
to make their individual notifications. Market parties may also post Balancing Mechanism 
offers (increase power to system) and bids (reduce power to system) specifying the BMU of 
delivery – usually in pairs. The system operator acceptance of a bid or offer is a firm 
contract (generally no cancellation). Unwinding of a BM contract is by expiry of instruction 
or acceptance of a reverse trade. The system operator has discretion to trade energy with 
the wider energy market for physical balancing purposes (the SO is prohibited from making 
any speculative financial trades) and to procure specialist balancing services (ancillary 
services) using various platforms. The net energy position of system operator is the market 
net imbalance volume (NIV). Figure 14 shows the flow of information in balancing and 
settlement. 
 
Figure 14: Balancing market information flows 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
 30 
Figure 15 shows the bids and offers for one BMU that is offering to go up and bidding to go 
down in 50 MW increments, at given deviations from its FPN position. Initially it is offering 
to go up 50 MW for £27/MWh or to go down by 50 MW for £75/MWh. All the bids offered 
in the BM must lie within the maximum export limit (or generator and transmission 
equipment might be damaged) and the minimum stable export limit (so that minimum 
stable production levels are exceeded). 
 
Figure 15: Bids in the balancing mechanism 
 
Source: National Grid. 
 
Imbalance cashout prices are calculated as follows. The system operator will enter many 
contracts in each half-hour trading period for energy balancing actions and system balancing 
actions to provide reserve, frequency response capacity and utilisation and congestion 
resolution. Some system actions will be specifically flagged by the system operator and 
excluded from imbalance pricing. The remaining buy and sell actions will be ranked in price 
order. Energy balancing actions are defined as the cheapest actions in the net imbalance 
volume (NIV) direction. The imbalance price is determined by the average of the most 
expensive bids in the Price Average Reference Volume (PAR) in the NIV direction. Currently 
the PAR is set at 50 MWh. An example of ranked up and down bids in the balancing 
mechanism is shown in Figure 16.52 
 
  
                                                     
52 These offers and bids are all of the actions taken by the system operator in a half hour 
period. The flagged actions in blue reflect actions taken for system specific reasons which 
could be to do with frequency control or constraint management. The unflagged actions in 
orange are for energy balancing. The NIV is measured looking at the net impact of all actions 
taken by the SO. It shows that there were 475.5 MWh of offers and 245 MWh of bids taken, 
so the market was short by 230.5 MWh. The system imbalance price is the marginal net 
imbalance offer required to solicit 230.5 MWh of net supply, which in this case is £60 / 
MWh.  
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Figure 16: Ranked bids in the balancing mechanism 
 
BSAA = Balance Service Adjustment Action 
Source: National Grid 
 
System Operator Incentive Schemes ensure that the system operator minimises the external 
costs it imposes on the system. This applies to intermittent renewable generators who are – 
correctly - exposed to their greater likelihood of being imbalanced and hence can expect to 
receive less average revenue per MWh as a result53.  Initially after privatisation the external 
(balancing) costs of operating the transmission system were passed through to suppliers 
and onto consumers without any market actor taking responsibility. As a result, there was a 
sharp rise in such costs. These costs included: congestion costs, reserve & frequency 
response, losses and reactive power. Following prompting by the regulator, National Grid 
bilaterally negotiated an external cost management incentive scheme.  The resets of this 
scheme were subsequently overseen by the regulator. This has resulted in a series of 
incentive schemes on NGET to reduce operational costs. There was a sliding scale that 
shares costs & benefits with customers, usually over a short (1 or 2 year) duration. The 
sharing factors + caps/collars limit risk of negative externalities on consumers and provide 
some internalisation of consequences of NGET investment and network asset management 
decisions. Figure 17, shows the evolution of system constraint payments, which initially fell 
under incentive regulation in England and Wales. These then increased when National Grid’s 
role was extended to cover the whole of Great Britain. Figure 18 shows the evolution of 
National Grid’s entire external costs of system operation over the period. 
 
  
                                                     
53 See Newbery (2012) for a discussion of this. 
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Figure 17: National Grid Electricity Transmission System Operator constraint payments 
(nominal £) 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
Figure 18: National Grid Electricity System Operation external costs (nominal £) 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
The role of the system operator, National Grid Electricity Transmission System Operator 
(NGET SO), has developed over time. Pre-privatisation (i.e. before 1989) it involved real-
time operation of CEGB (in England & Wales) generation and transmission assets. From 
1990-1994 the England & Wales transmission system operator provided a central dispatch 
agency service to the market. From 1994-2000 it was a transmission system operator and 
central despatch agent with exposure to balancing costs. From 2001-2004 the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements were in operation (with self-dispatch market) and the 
balancing incentive remained. From 2005- the British Electricity Trading & Transmission 
Arrangements have been in place (Scotland joins NETA). This, additionally, made National 
Grid responsible for system operation and balancing in Scotland. From 2014- NGET SO was 
appointed Electricity Market Reform delivery agent (which includes the administration of 
the central government Capacity Mechanism and low carbon Contracts for Differences). In 
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2015 NGET SO was given enhanced system planning responsibilities following Ofgem’s 
Integrated Transmission Planning & Regulation Project.  
 
As of mid-2018, National GrId is planning to place the system operator in a wholly separate 
company from 2019. Anaya and Pollitt (2017) have made a number of recommendations to 
Ofgem about how this more independent system operator might be regulated, drawing on 
the experiences of independent system operators (ISOs) in the US, South America and 
Australia. Good regulation involves not only assessing the efficient amount of revenue that 
the ISO requires but also ensuring the efficiency of its procurement methods (market-based) 
and system optimisation (procurement levels). Stakeholders (generators, network 
companies, retailers and customer groups) play a key role in the proposal and design of 
detailed implementation rules for new initiatives for the best ISOs. Sophisticated voting 
rules are observed and are worthy of study for the lessons they might have for GB. A high 
level of internal and external oversight of ISO decision making is observed which is 
becoming more complex and subject to high levels of uncertainty. In electricity, US ISO State 
of Market Reports provide excellent examples of regular updates on key recommendations 
for future market design.  
 
A recent issue that has arisen in system operation in Great Britain is the efficiency of the 
procurement of ancillary services by the system operator. Typically, the GB SO has 3-5 GW 
of reserve contracted a day ahead. For example, it procures a large number of ancillary 
services under different procurement mechanisms. It uses auctions (pay-as-bid) for 
balancing market (BM), firm fast response, short term operating reserve (STOR), STOR 
Runway, enhanced optimal STOR, firm frequency response (FFR) (primary, secondary and 
high), enhanced frequency response (EFR). It uses bilateral tenders for balancing mechanism 
start up, demand turn up, mandatory frequency response, frequency control by demand 
side management (DSM), FFR bridging contracts, transmission constraint management, 
contingency balancing reserve, max generation, intertrips, black start and SO to SO 
transactions. In addition, some services such as reactive power are procured at fixed prices.  
 
As these lists indicate there are a large number of ancillary service products. In 2016 there 
were 30 ancillary service products in GB, now reduced to around 22. However questions 
have been raised as to whether this could be reduced further (perhaps to just four: reserve, 
security, frequency and voltage support). Greve at al. (2018) discuss how the ancillary 
services (A/S) product definition needs to be clarified with too many ill-defined products. 
The SO needs to justify procurement quantities and express trade-offs transparently. 
Opportunities for gaming system may well exist and be increasing as the products become 
more important, especially if there are a lack of penalties for creating A/S demand. Optimal 
contracts are not currently clear because of the uncertain nature of the counter-party to the 
SO. Distribution system operator (DSO) - TSO conflicts need to be resolved as DSOs increase 
their relative ability to supply A/S.  
 
Demand for ancillary services in GB has, apparently, not risen much even though RES share 
has risen significantly. Meanwhile prices for some ancillary services have fallen recently due 
to increased competition, including from electrical energy storage (EES) and from 
interconnectors under conditions of low demand growth. As an example of falling prices see 
Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Falling prices for firm frequency response 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
Recently the government has introduced a capacity mechanism in Great Britain, which is 
administered by the system operator. Capacity mechanisms have a history in GB. Up until 
1989 there was centrally planned capacity to meet 9 winters per century loss of load 
probability within the CEGB. From 1990-2000 retail companies had a 9 winters per century 
obligation which could be discharged by purchasing energy in the Pool market. The Pool 
purchase price = SMP + (VoLL – SMP)*LOLP, where SMP – was the system marginal price 
(the market clearing price), VoLL was the value of lost load and LOLP was loss of load 
probability. Capacity was paid VoLL * LOLP.  
 
However, there were concerns that SMP & LOLP are subject to manipulation by generators 
with market power. In 2001-2004 under the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), 
there were only firm bilateral energy only contracts and LOLP obligations removed. This has 
continued under BETTA. In 2012 Government Energy Market Reform (EMR) identified the 
need for capacity mechanism. In 2013 Regulator made a final decision on cashout pricing 
(incorporating a VoLL). From 2013 on, the Supplemental Balancing Reserve (SBR) and 
Demand Side Balancing Reserve (DSBR) were introduced to provide extra winter capacity. 
These schemes paid for additional emergency capacity. In 2014 the capacity market began 
with a t-4 years-ahead auction (for winter 2018/19) which cleared at £19.4 / kW.54 However 
the most recent auction in 2017 the t-4 auction cleared at £8.40 / kW. 
 
The developing experience of GB offers a number of lessons for China. The system operator 
function is important in that it lies at the heart of the system. The SO needs an incentive to 
manage its own internal costs. In GB, the SO has internal revenue of £140m p.a. subject to a 
50% incentive rate. It is even more Important to incentivise the SO to procure external 
services efficiently. In GB, the external costs are c.£850m p.a. Now subject to +/-£30m 
stakeholder panel determined incentive.55 The SO does not need to be integrated with 
                                                     
54 There are t-1 years capacity auctions as well. 
55 See Ofgem (2018d), 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2018/02/policy_decision_on_electricity_syst
em_operator_regulatory_and_incentives_framework_from_april_2018.pdf 
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transmission operator (TO) to function effectively. SO functions are increasingly subject to 
competition and market testing. The work of co-optimising wholesale energy and ancillary 
services markets56 (and indeed further co-optimising across wholesale power markets and 
network investments) remains an important work in progress in all advanced electricity 
systems. 
 
9. Distribution charges 
 
Incentive regulation of distribution charges has led to a very strong relative reduction in 
distribution charges. Between 1995, when charges were first reset by the regulator and 
2005, prices fell by around 50% for the average distribution company in England and Wales 
and by more in some areas (e.g. SWEB in the south west of England).57 The reduction being 
larger than in transmission charges in England and Wales. At the same time quality of 
service improved substantially, with average customer minutes lost falling from over 100 
minutes per year in 1990 to around 30 minutes today. Figure 20 shows the fall in real 
distribution charges. 
 
Figure 20: The development of real distribution revenue since privatisation 
average DNO in England and Wales 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
It is important to stress that overall revenues for distribution companies are determined by 
the regulator as discussed in section 6 above. They are then charged out to individual 
customer groups in each distribution company area via a common charging methodology.  
 
                                                     
56 See Anaya and Pollitt (2018) for a discussion of co-optimisation. 
57 Domah and Pollitt (2001) find significant gains for society following the privatisation and 
incentive regulation of the regional electricity companies (RECs) that owned the distribution 
and incumbent retail assets. 
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Connection charges are charged to generators and loads/distributors according to which is 
requesting connection and to cover sole use assets. Generators need to contribute to the 
cost of upgrading the distribution system up to the next substation at the voltage level at 
which they are connected (so called ‘shallowish’ connection charging). Similar to 
transmission use of system charges (TNUoS), distribution use of system charges (DNUoS) are 
charged to generators and loads: generators pay per MW connected and loads pay per MW 
and per MWh. Most of the revenue of a distribution company is collected from loads and 
this is disproportionately paid by households. There are strong incentive payments for 
quality of service (e.g. reducing customer minutes lost) and these can substantially increase 
the rate of return on a distribution company’s assets. 
 
Over recent years, new generation is increasingly connecting to distribution grid (at 
132/33kV and below). Since 2011 around 13 GW of solar (all of it connected to the 
distribution grid) has been connected in Great Britain against peak demand of 54 GW. The 
charging methodology is substantially based on per MWh charges for smaller customers 
who are not half-hourly metered. There have been worries that this does not reflect the 
fixed costs of the network and hence over-incentivises self-generation (and storage).58 
However this might be offset by a managed rise in electric vehicle charging within the 
distribution network, that does not substantially add to the peak system requirements but 
makes more use of the existing distribution network.59  
 
The future roles of transmission owners, the system operator and the distribution network 
companies are evolving as distributed generation (DG) increases and demand falls on the 
national transmission system. Who should have balancing responsibility and how should 
they fulfil it? There is a potential for distribution companies and third parties (such as 
customers and microgrids) to take more responsibility in system balancing and other 
traditional functions of the transmission network and its system operator. Balancing the 
system can be met by market based solutions or via regulated assets (e.g. should a storage 
facility be a commercial or regulated asset?). The distribution system has traditionally been 
a passive network, however the rise of DG means that it is becoming more active. This has 
led to reactive power (voltage) issues in parts of network, which could be procured locally or 
mitigated by action of the distribution company. The benefits of any new arrangement need 
to be proven for customers and some ongoing innovation projects are trialing novel 
solutions to this60. 
 
The lessons for China from the experience in Great Britain can be summed up as follows. 
Distribution pricing is an important component of overall electricity costs and incentive 
regulation can deliver impressive results. How overall charges are apportioned is very 
important and potentially highly distortionary in a more active network world. Therefore, 
there is a need to think carefully about how to deliver locational incentives. Recovering 
network fixed costs is a major issue for distribution networks, especially for a system where 
                                                     
58 See Pollitt (2018b) for a discussion. 
59 See Kufeoglu and Pollitt (2018) for some analysis of the impact of EVs on who pays 
residential distribution charges in GB. 
60 See for example, National Grid and UKPN’s Power Potential Project. The background 
issues to this project are discussed in Anaya and Pollitt (2018). 
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passive residential consumers are not shouldering a significant share of network costs at the 
moment. Technological developments will heighten tariff methodology issues everywhere, 
including in China. 
 
10. Environmental levies and taxes 
 
There are a number of important taxes and levies which are part of the industrial price of 
electricity in GB. These are a portion of the main renewables support schemes, namely, the 
Renewables Obligation (RO), the feed in tariffs (FITs) for smaller generators and contracts-
for-differences (CFDs) (which will include nuclear power eventually). In addition, industrial 
customers contribute to the Hydro-Benefit Scheme, to support consumers in northern 
Scotland, and pay climate policy inspired energy efficiency charges including the climate 
change levy / carbon reduction commitment (CCL / CRC) and carbon pricing via the impact 
on generation prices of EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and carbon taxes in the form 
of the domestic carbon price support (CPS). We discuss each element in turn. 
 
The RO Scheme is a tradeable green certificate scheme. Suppliers/retailers must present 
renewable obligation certificates (ROCs) for a percentage of sales. Renewable generators 
must be registered on the Renewables and CHP register at Ofgem to be awarded ROCs.61 
For instance, in 2014-15, 71.3 million ROCs presented for 1MWh each, this represented 
99.1% of the total obligation on suppliers. The administratively set buy out price was £43.30 
per ROC. The buyout price set the price for the ROCs presented. The buyout revenue is 
recycled to actual suppliers of ROCs, meaning that each ROC was worth £43.65 (recycle 
value was £0.35 plus the £43.30 buy-out price) to a renewable generator62. There is an 85% 
exemption from paying towards the ROC scheme for energy intensive users, but normally it 
is recovered by retailers per MWh on all loads.63 The RO scheme closed in 2017 to new 
generators but it is the most significant renewable support scheme financially. 
 
Small scale FIT payments offer fixed prices per MWh to generators of different sizes (but 
usually less than 5 MW). The technologies effected include wind, solar, hydro and anaerobic 
digestion.64 These were initially very generous for solar, given the rapidly falling price of PV.  
CFDs are now the main way by which the UK government supports renewables (and new 
nuclear). It is set to become significant as projects financed by CFD contracts are completed. 
There have been auctions for CFD contracts in Feb 2015 and Aug 2017, both of which 
delivered significant quantities of lower price bids than the previous – interim - 
administrative CFD prices. In the first auction, winning onshore wind bids were 17% lower 
than the administrative CFD price and winning offshore wind bids were 18% lower than the 
                                                     
61 See 
https://www.renewablesandchp.ofgem.gov.uk/Public/ReportManager.aspx?ReportVisibility
=1&ReportCategory=0 
62 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/renewables-obligation-ro 
63 See Grubb and Drummond (2018). 
64 See Helm (2017, p.101). 
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previous administrative price.65 In the most recent auction winning bids fell again, with 
offshore wind projects winning at a price of £57.50 / MWh for delivery in 2022/23.66 This 
was against an administrative price of £140 / MWh prior to the first auction, only two and 
half years earlier. 
 
The hydro-benefit scheme is an interesting cross-subsidy paid by all customers in GB to 
reduce the high costs of electricity distribution in the region with the lowest population 
density. Following liberalisation in 1990, the introduction of the wholesale power market 
threatened to unwind the internal cross-subsidy (within an integrated utility) between the 
low cost of generation and high cost of distribution in the Scottish Hydro area in north of 
Scotland. Initially the ‘hydro-benefit scheme’ taxed the hydro generation and subsidized the 
distribution charges in the Scottish Hydro area. Later the high distribution cost was covered 
by levy on all consumption across GB – via the Hydro-benefit replacement scheme.67 
 
Industrial customers can be subject to two energy efficiency taxes, which although they are 
nominally related to climate policy do not tax carbon directly but energy use. The climate 
change levy (CCL) was set at £5.83 / MWh in April 2018. It is charged to large energy 
intensive users and is subject to a 90% rebate if voluntary climate change agreement in 
place. The carbon reduction commitment (CRC) is set at £17.20-18.30 / tonne CO2 in 
2018/19 on larger commercial users of electricity to encourage investment in energy 
management. It is calculated on the deemed carbon content of grid supplied electricity. It 
has been abolished from 2019. 
 
Carbon Pricing has a significant impact on the industrial electricity price. This happens in 
two ways, via the participation of the UK electricity sector in the EU ETS and the additional 
imposition of a carbon tax on fossil fuels used in electricity generation in the UK, via the 
carbon price support (CPS). The CPS effectively increases the price of carbon emissions from 
the electricity sector in the UK above that in the rest of the EU. The CPS is part of the carbon 
price floor (CPF) which sets a target price for the combined EU ETS and CPS price in the UK. 
It began in April 2013 with a target CPF CO2 price of £30/tonne (in 2009 terms) – forward 
EUA price + CPS - by 2020 (possibly £70/tonne by 2030). However, the CPS is now capped at 
£18 /tCO2 (now binding). The CPS directly impacts the wholesale price via raising the price 
of marginal fossil generation. EUA price currently £14.08 per tonne CO2 (13/07/18). By 
2017, the impact of £18 per tonne CPS was enough to push much of the remaining coal fired 
generation off the system.68 
 
                                                     
65 See: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/407465/Breakdown_information_on_CFD_auctions.pdf 
66 See: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/643560/CFD_allocation_round_2_outcome_FINAL.pdf 
67 See DECC (2015), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/488271/decc_consultation_hydro_benefit_review_22_dec_15__2_.pdf 
68 See Wilson and Staffell (2018). 
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The combined impact of these levies and taxes on the industrial price of electricity is 
substantial in Great Britain. A key question for China is the extent to which industrial 
electricity customers can and should be subject to payments for low carbon generation, 
energy efficiency and carbon pricing. Some other countries, such as Germany, have 
exempted much of their industry from bearing the costs of government policy in the 
electricity sector. This is only possible in systems where industry is a relatively small share of 
total electricity demand. This is not the case in China. It is right that all electricity consumers 
pay the true cost of electricity and this includes charges which reflect the externality cost of 
carbon emissions from power plants or the local environmental benefit of cleaner 
technologies. However, it remains an open question as to whether some of the cost of the 
energy transition should be shifted from electricity consumers onto general taxation 
because the current relatively high cost of renewables is a function of its technological 
immaturity and hence there is a wider public benefit from the learning by doing effect of 
subsidy.69 Energy efficiency policies are wider than just electricity use and hence it is worth 
thinking about whether payment for these policies are fairly targeted on electricity users, 
especially when it may be poorer electricity customers that end up paying 
disproportionately for them. 
 
11. Overall lessons on price determination for China from Great Britain 
 
Following the theory of the spot pricing of electricity due to Schweppe and colleagues70, the 
price for every industrial customer should vary by location, time, quantity and willingness to 
accept interruption. However, in the real world of liberalized markets there is much less bill 
variation than the underlying price components would suggest as final customers value 
certainty in pricing. In general, the focus in a liberalised market is on what the customer is 
getting for their money and away from the producer, except in the sense that producer 
needs a fair return on capital. In an initially profitable system – such as in China - reform 
should be about rebalancing the electricity system away from producer to consumer 
interests, i.e. from inefficient costs and high profits towards cheaper, cleaner and more 
reliable electricity supply. 
 
There is a key role for the profit motive in a liberalised market as a guide to decision making. 
Transparency on price components is important for promoting better regulation and more 
competition. Wholesale power and ancillary services costs are reduced over the longer run 
by the use of wholesale spot markets to guide both short term dispatch and long-term 
investment in fossil fuel power plants. Transmission and distribution charges are an 
important component of costs, even in the UK these are 20% of the industrial price (where 
generation costs are 33%) and incentive regulation of network charges can bring large 
improvements in both cost efficiency and network quality. In China, there is a need to 
understand and expand role of retailers by separating them fully from distribution. State 
Grid Company of China and China Southern Grid (SGCC and CSG) provincial retail should be 
fully legally unbundled from distribution and allowed to compete nationally for retail 
customers. Competition in generation and retail needs to be effectively overseen and 
                                                     
69 See Newbery (2017). 
70 See Bohn et al. (1984). 
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regulated by both the regulator (the NEA) and the Anti-Monopoly authorities as pressure to 
consolidate the sector and undesirable price discrimination is likely. 
 
In China, there is a need for a focus on the big picture (e.g. how much have aggregate 
prices/efficiency/profits changed) rather than just the detail (e.g. zonal vs nodal pricing, 
central vs self-dispatch). The aim should be to stop the power sector being subject to 
purchasing requirements for domestic technology and domestic natural resources (in GB 
the electricity industry eventually escaped from its historic commitment to buying 
expensive British coal). In China, local taxation and non-externality related charges can 
distort production choices and impose unnecessary industrial policy costs on other 
industrial electricity customers. Instead the power sector’s key role should be understood to 
be in promoting development in the wider economy by efficient (and fully cost reflective) 
pricing. It is important to produce electricity efficiently and use taxation to drive up the 
price to promote energy efficiency and decarbonisation, rather than letting incumbents 
justify high prices on grounds of energy efficiency. 
 
Challenges remain for all countries, including China, in the future development of the power 
sector, with the rise of new distributed energy technologies. The current electricity system 
is characterized by high fixed costs which should be recovered. It is difficult to prevent 
behind the meter investments to avoid paying towards these fixed costs. This suggests there 
may be a need to lift some electricity system costs to general taxation (e.g. energy R+D, 
energy efficiency measures). In China, as the growth in the number of kWhs distributed 
slows attention to fixed costs will increase. More competition and better network regulation 
will lower profit margins at home, to the benefit of consumers and the discouragement of 
wasteful investment abroad and it will reduce concerns about private/foreign ownership in 
the electricity sector, as has happened in the UK. 
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Oral History of Electricity Privatisation: British Library archive of key players: 
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– http://sounds.bl.uk/Oral-history/Industry-water-steel-and-energy/021M-
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• John Wakeham – Secretary of State of Energy 
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C1495X0048XX-0001V0 
• William Rickett – Civil Servant involved with privatisation 
http://sounds.bl.uk/Oral-history/Industry-water-steel-and-energy/021M-C1495X0033XX-
0004V0  
• Brian Pomeroy – Advisor on Electricity Privatisation 
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• Fiona Woolf – Advisor on Electricity Privatisation 
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